








Allocation Aggregation for a Finite Valuation Domain





An nm  matrix A = (aij) is an s-allocation matrix if  (1)  each entry of A is  a nonnegative real number and  (2) the sums of the entries in each row of A are identically equal to some fixed positive real number s.  When n = 1, an s-allocation matrix is called an s-allocation row vector. Let A(n,m;s) denote the set of all nm  s-allocation matrices, and A(m;s) the set of all m-dimensional s-allocation row vectors. An allocation aggregation method (AAM) is any mapping  F: A(n,m;s) A(m;s).  Each s-allocation matrix  A = (aij) may be thought of as recording the opinions of n individuals regarding the most appropriate values of  variables x1,…,xm , constrained to be nonnegative and to sum to s, with aij denoting the value assigned by individual i to variable xj.  Each AAM       F furnishes a method, applicable to every conceivable s-allocation matrix A, of reconciling the possibly different opinions recorded in A in the form of the group assignment F(A) = a = (a1,…,am).  In what follows, the jth column of a matrix A is denoted by Aj , and the jth entry of the row vector  a  is denoted by  aj. The n1 column vector with all entries equal to c is denoted by c. If  A = (aij)  and  B = (bij) are any matrices with identical dimensions,  we write  A  B to indicate that  aij  bij  for all 
i and j.

Aggregation theory has followed social choice theory in adopting an axiomatic approach to the study of AAMs. Typical axiomatic restrictions on aggregation have included, for example:

Irrelevance of Alternatives (IA).  For all j {1,…,m}, and  all A, B A(n,m;s), 
Aj = Bj  F(A)j = F(B)j.

Strong Label Neutrality (SLN).  For all j,k {1,…,m}, and  all A, B A(n,m;s), 
Aj = Bk  F(A)j = F(B)k.

Zero Preservation (ZP).  For  all j {1,…,m},  and all  A A(n,m;s), 
 Aj = 0   F(A)j = 0.

Theorem 1. (Lehrer and Wagner 1981).  If m  3, and the AAM F satisfies IA and Z, then it satisfies SLN.

Clearly, IA is equivalent to the existence of functions fj : [0,s]n [0,s], j = 1,…,m, such that, for all A  A(n,m;s),  F(A)j = fj(Aj)   and  fj(Aj) = s.  SLN strengthens IA to 
require that the functions fj are identically equal to some function f.  When m  3, the following theorem characterizes those AAMs satisfying  IA and Z:




2.  Finite Valuation Domains

In Theorems 1 and 2, the valuation domain, i.e., the set of values that may be assigned to the variables, is the infinite closed interval [0,s].  In real world allocation problems, however, valuation domains will necessarily be finite. As shown below, under certain mild closure conditions on such domains (satisfied, inter alia, by [0,s]), only dictatorial aggregation satisfies IA and Z.
 
Theorem 3.  If  s > 0,  a finite subset  V  of  [0,s]  with cardinality r + 1 satisfies 

 (1)  0V ,  

 (2)  xV  s – x V,  and

 (3)  x,yV  and  x + y  s   x + y V

if and only if   V = { ks/r : k = 0,1,…,r}.

Proof.  Sufficiency: obvious.  Necessity: If  r = 1, the result is obvious. Suppose then that r  2, and let be the smallest positive element of V. 

(i)  If  < s/r, then by repeated application of (3) it follows that 
kV, k =0,1,…,r, and hence by (2) that  s - rV. By assumption,  s – r > 0.  Moreover,  s – r < , for otherwise  (r + 1) s, which would imply that 
(r + 1)V, and hence that  |V| > (r + 1. But this contradicts the assumption that is the smallest positive element of V.

(ii)  If  > s/r, then  r > s, and so  r V.  Let  m  be the largest integer for which  m   s, whence m < r,  mV, and  s – m V. Suppose that  m< s.  Then 
 0 < s – m< , again contradicting the assumption that is the smallest positive element of V. So   = s/m.   Morever, V = {0, s/m, …, (m – 1)s/m, s} . Otherwise, there existsV  such that  ks/m<  < (k+1)s/m, where 1 k m – 1. Let  
* : =   + (m – 1 – k)s/m.  Then (m – 1)s/m < * < s,  and so  *  V  and 
 s – *  V.  Furthermore,  0 < s – * < s/m, contradicting the assumption that  s/m  is the smallest positive element of  V.  Hence |V| = m + 1 < r + 1, contradicting the assumption that |V| = r + 1.

By  (i) and (ii), it follows that  = s/r.  Since ks/r V  for k = 0,1,…,r
and |V| = r + 1, it must be the case that  V = {ks/r  : k = 0,1,…,r}.           □


In the remainder of this note,  V denotes a finite subset of  [0,s]  satisfying the closure conditions (1), (2), and (3) above,  A(n,m;s,V)  denotes the set of all  nm  s-allocation matrices with entries limited to elements of V , and A(m;s,V) the set of all 
m-dimensional s-allocation row vectors with entries limited to elements of V.  
Allocation aggregation methods are now mappings  F: A(n,m;s,V) A(m;s,V).

Theorem 4.  If  m  3,  and  F: A(n,m;s,V) A(m;s,V) satisfies IA and Z, then it satisfies SLN.

Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 1, which only uses the fact that [0,s] satisfies the closure properties (1), (2), (3).  □

An AAM  F  is dictatorial if there exists an individual d{1,…,n} such that for all 
A A(n,m;s,V),  F(A) = (ad1, ad2,…,adm).  

Theorem 5.  If  m  3,  an  AAM  F: A(n,m;s,V) A(m;s,V)  satisfies  IA  and  Z  if and only if  F is dictatorial.

Proof. Sufficiency: obvious.  Necessity:  By Theorem 4, F satisfies SLN, and so there exists a function  f : Vn  V  such that, for all  A A(n,m;s,V)  and  all  j{1,…,m}, F(A)j = f(Aj).  Moreover, 

(4)       f(X + Y) = f(X) + f(Y)     for all  X, YVn  such that  X, Y, and X + Y   s.

This follows from considering matrices A and B in A(n,m;s,V)  defined (with vertical lines separating columns) by  A = (X |  Y  |   s – X – Y | 0 | … |0)   and   
B = (X + Y  |   s – X – Y |  0  | 0| …|0),  and noting that by Z,  f(0) = 0. Summing the values of  f  over the columns of A and B then yields f(X) + f(Y) + f(s – X – Y) = s
 = f(X + Y) + f(s – X – Y), and hence (4).  Summing the values of  f  over the columns of 
C = (s | 0 | …| 0 )  shows that 

(5)         f(s) = s. 

By induction, the functional equation (4) can be extended to any finite number of summands X, Y, Z, …, so long as X, Y, Z,…, X + Y + Z + …   s.  With (5), this yields

(6)         f(s/r) = s/r      and, more generally,     f(ks/r) = ks/r,   k = 0,…,r.
 
      Next, associate with the function  f: Vn  V  functions  f ‹i› : VV, i = 1,…,n, defined for all xV  by  f ‹i›(x) = f(0,…,0,x,0…,0), where x occupies the ith position in the preceding vector. Clearly,

(7)          f(x1,…,xn) = f ‹1›(x1) + f ‹2›(x2) + …+ f ‹n›(xn)     for all  (x1,…,xn) Vn,

 and by (4), 

(8)        f ‹i›(x + y) = f ‹i›(x) + f ‹i›(y) for all x,y V such that  x, y, and x + y   s. 

 Recall that V = { ks/r : k = 0,1,…,r}.  By (6) and (7),

(9)                f(s/r) = f ‹1›(s/r) + f ‹2›(s/r) + …+ f ‹n›(s/r) = s/r.

Since the values of  f, and hence of the functions f ‹i›, are constrained to lie in V, this implies that there exists an individual d{1,…,n} such that

(10)               f ‹d›(s/r) = s/r       and     f ‹i›(s/r) = 0  for all  id,

and repeated application of (8) to (10) then yields

(11)             f ‹d›(ks/r) = ks/r       and     f ‹i›(ks/r) = 0  for all  id,    k = 0,…,r.

i.e., for all xV,

(12)             f ‹d›(x) = x      and     f ‹i›(x) = 0  for all id.
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